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RECENT CASES
Probate-Award in Lieu of Homestead -Fractional Award. P's hubsand died
intestate in 1944 leaving P and an adult daughter as his only heirs. His estate at
death contained a house appraised at $4,000, household goods at $250, and other
property at $1,600. P's petition for $3,000 as an award in lieu of homestead under
REm. Rxv. STAT. § 1473 [P P C. § 205] was opposed by D, the daughter. The trial
court awarded the house and household goods to P, charging the property with a
lien of $1,250 in favor of the estate. D appeals. Held. Reversed. It was error (1)
to award property of greater value than the statutory amount ($3,000) even though
subject to a lien, and (2) the property should have been evaluated as of the date
the petition was filed rather than the date of the death. In re Small's Estate, 127
Wn.(2d) 677, 179 P.(2d) 505 (1947).
The noteworthy problem presented by the first ground of reversal is whether
the surviving spouse is entitled to have an award in lieu of homestead satisfied by
the creation of an interest in the home when its value exceeds the amount of the
statutory award and when the value of the household goods and other property of
the estate, which the court in its discretion might award, is not great enough to
make up the authorized amount.
It has been the practice in Washington to use the award in lieu of homestead
in settling small estates when decedent has died intestate with no minor heirs.
Grzesemer v. Boyer and Rex, 13 Wash. 171, 194 Pac. 834 (1895). The statute author-
izes the award to be made from either community or separate property of the
estate "not exceeding the value of three thousand dollars which property so set
off shall include the home and household goods, if any. " REM. Rsv. STAT.
§ 1473 [P P C. § 205-1]. The purpose of the statute is to prevent the dependency
of the surviving spouse by providing a home and household goods. In re Lavenberg's
Estate, 104 Wash. 515, 177 Pac. 328 (1918), In re Welch's Estate, 200 Wash. 686,
94 P. (2d) 758 (1939). The surviving spouse may not select other property in prefer-
ence to the house and household goods. If the full value is not reached by an
award of the house and furniture, the court may award other property at its dis-
cretion. In re Jones' Estate, 11 Wn.(2d) 254, 118 P.(2d) 951 (1941). The statutory
amount may have been adequate when the statute was enacted, but recent inflation
has raised the value of most homes above the amount which may be set aside. The
statute was revised in 1945 to provide for an award of $4,000. WASH. LAWS 1945,
c. 197, § 1. [P P C. § 205-1 (1945 Supp.)].
In discussing the related problem of probate homesteads some courts have held
that if there is no limitation of value and the property of the estate is indivisible,
the whole of such premises should be set aside. In re Levy's Estate, 141 Cal. 646,
75 Pac. 301 (1904). Or if there is a limitation and the property is not capable of
proper division, the court may order the property sold and an exemption awarded
to the widow from the proceeds. Hamilton v. Wilcox, 167 Mich. 551, 133 N. W
615 (1911). Kentucky provides by statute for a payment in money if the property
is of excess value and is not divisible. Warren's Adm'r v. Warren, 126 Ky. 692, 104
S. W 754 (1907). Substantially the same result has been reached in Vermont.
Chaplin v. Sawyer, 35 Vt. 286 (1862). However, this will not ordinarily be done
without a specific statute as the legislative intent is normally construed as an attempt
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to make the premises available for occupancy by the surviving spouse. This purpose
is essentially defeated by the substitution of money, Richardson v. Trubey, 250 Ill.
577, 95 N. F. 971 (1911). A logical solution might be the creation of a tenancy in
common in the estate, awarding the petitioner an interest equal to the value desig-
nated by the statute; or the property might be sold and the proceeds invested in a
trust for the benefit of the widow. Compare Wardell v. Wardell, 71 Nebr. 774, 99
N. W. 674 (1904).
The trial court in the Small case attempted to make a fractional award of the
house and furniture, holding that the creation of an interest in property is as much
an award of value as setting off property of the exact statutory amount. The
Supreme Court denied the validity of this award but did not suggest what procedure
the trial court should follow in disposing of the petition. The court may intend (1)
that the property is to be sold and a cash award set aside, or (2) that a propor-
tional interest be created by tenancy in common, or (3) that some sort of partition
and distribution is to be made when the property is, if ever, divisible. Or possibly
(4) under facts similar to those in the present case, the surviving spouse is simply
to be precluded from the benefits provided by the statute.
Prior to this decision the fractional award was probably recognized as the normal
and logical solution. Of the remaining alternatives, none of which appear entirely
satisfactory, the substitution of a cash award seems most widely used. While adop-
tion of this procedure would have the virtue of clarifying our law, it nonetheless
fails to give the petitioner the use of the home.
L. V. R.
Administrative Law-Delegation of Legislative Powers-Requirement of a Standard.
In order to prevent a strike being called against the Olympia Public Port
by the longshoremen's union, the manager of the Port had to promise to pay any
wage increase ultimately established in negotiations to be conducted by the long-
shoremen's union and the waterfront employer's association. The public port was
not a party to the negotiations. Many months later an agreement calling for wage
increases was reached, and the port moved to pay the amount due. This test suit
was brought by a taxpayer to restrain the payment. The court found that a contract
had been formed at the time of the making of the manager's promise if the port
commission had the power to obligate itself to pay a wage increase to be determined
by negotiations to which the port was not a party. Held: The legislative grant of
power to the port commission, RaM. REv. STAT. § 9692 [P P C. § 777-19], amounts
to a general power to employ, and from that is implied the power to contract for
labor in the same manner as do the public port's private competitors. The order of
the trial court issuing an injunction was reversed. Christie v. Port of Olympia, 127
Wash. Dec. 500, 179 P.(2d) 949.(1947).
It is unconstitutional for the legislature to delegate its legislative powers, but it
may determine what is to be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of hIs
authority. A delegation of power is not improper when a reasonably clear governing
standard is prescribed. Yakus vs. U. S., 321 U. S. 414 (1944), Unden Inc. v. Green-
ough, 181 Wash. 412, 43 P.(2d) 982 (1935), State ex rel. Washington Toll Bridge
Authiority v. Yelle, 195 Wash. 636, 82 P.(2d) 120 (1938). An exception to the
requirement of a standard exists in delegations to municipal corporations because
of the constitutionally recognized necessity of giving broad law-making powers to
local governments. The exception does not apply to the proprietary as distinct from
the governmental aspects of municipal corporations. Linne v. Bredes, 43 Wash.
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540, 86 Pac. 835 (1906). The statutes authorizing the operation of public port com-
missions contain grants of power within the proprietary aspect of a municipal cor-
poration. What is the standard accompanying the grant? Apparently the court in
holding that the public ports could act in the same manner as their private com-
petitors in contracting for labor is denominating the customs of the private ports
as the legislative standard. In effect, the private ports are given the power to alter
or adjust the manner in which the public ports are to use the power granted to them
by the legislature.
On the other hand, perhaps the court felt that prevailing business custom is an
adequate standard, such a standard would not be controlled by private discretion
but would be the product of economic forces beyond the control of any person
or group. See Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REv. 201 (1937).
A case closely in point, Wagner v. Mitwaukee, 177 Wis. 410, 188 N. W 487 (1922),
probably would have come out differently had this point been recognized.
What is the effect of the case on Washington law? There are at least two pre-
vious Washington cases wherein a dubious standard similar to that of the Christie
case is to be found. In State v. Bonham, 93 Wash. 489, 116 Pac. 377 (1916), the court
held that there was no unconstitutional delegation to the American Medical Asso-
ciation in a statute directing an official to be guided by the Association's list of
approved medical schools. This list was periodically revised by that association
acting under criteria determined by itself, thus, in effect, the legislature gave to
the Association the uncontrolled power to determine who could practice medicine
in Washington. The case of Morgan v. Department of Social Security, 14 Wn.(2d)
156, 127 P.(2d) 686 (1942), presented the somewhat different situation of whether
it was constitutional to delegate the power to a governmental agency to alter a
statute to make it conform with the federal social security program. Without much
discussion of the requirement of a standard, the court found no objection to having
the department's decision guided by the rules and regulations of the federal Social
Security Board. The Bonham case, the Morgan case, and the Christie case are in-
stances of an extremely liberal standard, each illustrates a standard subject to non-
legislative alteration, in effect, no standard at all.
The court's solution of the problem in the Christie case did not develop the
administrative law angle; accordingly, the case is of doubtful value as an adminis-
trative law precedent.
D. G.A.
Procedure - Withdrawal of Moor Opinion - Dismissal of Appeal. P was denied
workman's compensation by the Department of Labor and Industries. The superior
court reversed and allowed the claim. Appeal, reversal en banc with directions to
enter judgment disallowing the claim. While rehearing was pending, the parties
stipulated to dismiss the appeal and joined in moving the court to withdraw its
prior opinion. Held. motion to dismiss the appeal granted, but motion to withdraw
prior opinion denied. The court ordered the prior opinion published although
stating that it was no longer authoritative. Leschner v. The Department of Labor
and Industries, 129 Wash. Dec. 90, 185 P.(2d) 113 (1947).
In publishing the prior opinion, the court followed precedent. Dishman v. Whit-
ney, 124 Wash. 697, 215 Pac. 71 (1923), Hutchings v. Fanshier, 134 Wash. 704, 236
Pac. 119 (1925), In re Brown, 6 Wn.(2d) 215, 107 P.(2d) 1104 (1940). However,
on analysis this holding poses some interesting problems. RPm. REv. STAT. § 10
[P P C. § 110-9] provides that the filing of a petition for rehearing suspends, and
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the granting of the petition vacates, the prior opinion of the court. As stated in the
dissent, the cause was then before the court as if it were an original hearing.
When the court dismissed the appeal, nothing remained upon which a judgment
could operate. The entire appeal became, in legal effect, void ab initio. Why, then,
did the court insist on leaving the opinion in the reports? The answer seems to be
found in In re Brown, supra, where the court refused to withdraw the prior opinion
because "The filing of an opinion constitutes a step in the orderly procedure of this
court, leading up to final disposition of the cause. The record as made should stand
as this court's action in the course of the accomplishment of its judicial functions."
But the only important reason for publishing a record of any court's action is that
it may serve as a guide to the bar in future cases.
This is normally accomplished through the doctrine of stare decrses, but because
such an opinion is not authoritative, it stands "in that rather anomalous situation,
as the opinion, not of the court, but of the judges who signed the same." Nettleship
v. Shipman, 161 Wash. 292, 296 Pac. 1056 (1931), Mitchell vr. Maytag-Pacific-
Intermountain Co., 184 Wash. 342, 51 P.(2d) 313 (1935). Although this Supreme
Court text can not be cited as authority, it will undoubtedly carry great weight as
an indication of the court's future position on the same issues. Thus, to this extent,
the Supreme Court publishes a species of advisory opimons. Caveat: Since the court
ordered the present per curiam opinon published immediately after the prior moot
opinion, the careful attorney will be advised of its non-authoritative character. But
take note. this was done in neither Dishinan v. Whitney, supra, nor in Hutchings
v. Fanshter, supra.
The court also dismissed the appeal. In Washington it is discretionary with the
court whether it will dismiss an appeal which has become moot. It re Brown, supra.
But the court has consistently done so, Dishman v. Whitney, supra, Hutchings v.
Fanslher, supra; In re Brown, supra., as have the large majority of courts in other
jurisdictions. However, in the instant case the court might well have deemed it
inadvisable to dismiss because of resultant difficulties suggested in the dissent.
When the appeal is dismissed, the judgment of the superior court becomes final and
the claim must be paid. Private litigants are commonly allowed to dismiss on
settling their controversy because the law favors settlements, and presumably each
party will guard its own interest. However, here a department of the state govern-
ment is requesting the dismissal after both the department itself and the Supreme
Court have held the claim, to be improper and there was no reason to believe that
the same result would not be reached on the pending rehearing. Thus the depart-
ment is, in effect, agreeing to pay a claim from state funds when it has every
reason to believe it need not so do. Arguably the payment is illegal under a correct
interpretation of the statute. The dissenting opinion even states that the department
binds itself by the rule laid down in the superior court as to which claims it may
pay in the future (p. 91). Allowing the department to dismiss the appeal after the
litigation had been so nearly completed in its favor would seem to be an undesirable
exercise of the Supreme Court's discretionary power.
But are these the only alternatives, to dismiss or not to dismiss the appeal?
If the cause became moot due to a settlement, then it is suggested that the difficulty
might have been avoided had the court held the entire cause, rather than just the
appeal, moot and set aside the judgment of the lower court with directions to
dismiss the action on the basis of a new agreement between the parties. Hutchings
v. Fanshter, supra. Similar results were reached in Cullen et al. v. Ellis County
Levee Improvement District No. 3 (Tex. Civ. App.), 77 S. W. (2d) 310 (1934), and
Alejandrmo v. Quezon, 271 U. S. 528 (1925), although under somewhat different
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facts. Had this been done, the departmental decision denying the claim, rather than
the superior court judgment allowing the claim, would have become final, leaving
it at least legally disallowed and obviating some of the above difficulties.
M. C. T.
Bills and Notes - Holder in Due Course - Notice and Burden of Proof. P in
Spokane purchased a carload of secondhand furniture from D in New York. Part
of the price was paid in advance, and D shipped the goods under a bill of lading,
drawing a sight draft upon P for the balance. G company, a discounting firm, agreed
to purchase P's account and D endorsed the draft to G in blank. G advanced eighty
per cent of the draft to D, the remainder to be paid upon collection, then stamped
the number "8160" upon the back of the draft "for bank identification" and deposited
it and the bill of lading with its New York bank, which forwarded it to a Spokane
bank for collection. P paid the draft, but upon finding the furniture not as repre-
sented garnished the Spokane bank, which admitted having funds of D to the
amount of the draft. G intervened, claiming the money as holder in due course.
Concluding that G was not a bona fide holder without notice of the fraud, the trial
court entered judgment for P Appeal. Held. Affirmed. G failed to sustain the
burden of proving due course holding under REm. REv. STAT. § 3450 [P P C.
§ 758-17] [N. I. L. § 59] "apparently" because of the lack of a sufficient indorse-
ment on G's part, G's failure to investigate the transaction and the use of a decep-
tive indorsement, since D was a stranger to G, were circumstances showing bad
faith. Bowles v. Billik, 27 Wn.(2d) 629, 178 P.(2d) 954 (1947).
The N. I. L. § 59 states, in part:
but when it is shown that the title of any person who has negotiated the
instrument was defective, the burden is on the holder to prove that he or some
person under whom he claims acquired the title as holder in due course.
And Rzm. REv. STAT. § 3446 [P P C. § 758-9] [N. I. L. § 55] states
The title of a person who negotiates an instrument is defective within the mean-
ing of the act when he obtatned the instrument, or any signature thereto, by fraud,
duress, or force and fear, or other unlawful means, or for an illegal consideration,
or when he negotiates it in breach of faith, or under such circumstances as amount
to a fraud. (Italics ours.)
When D negotiated the draft to G, there had been no acceptance by P who was not,
therefore, bound on the instrument. The general thought expressed by the N. I. L.
is that title is defective when the promise to pay on the instrument was wrongfully
obtained. At the time of the negotiation to G, D's name was the only one on the
draft, and P's promise to pay had not been obtained. Under these circumstances
D's title was not defective in the usual N. I. L. sense, and G, the holder, should still
be entitled to the presumption of due course holding. Although the question is not
clearly presented in the opinion, the court may have felt that as distinct from the
fraud inherent in the purchase and sale transaction itself the negotiation by D with
knowledge of his own fraud and in anticipation of P' acceptance was "under such
circumstances as amount to a fraud." N. I. L. § 55, supra. It would seem fraudulent
for a person in possession of a negotiable instrument subject to a defense to
attempt to cut off the defense by negotiation. If this is the proper interpretation,
the result may be justifiable since some protection is thus afforded to buyers in sim-
ilar positions, and the negotiation of this type instrument is not seriously impaired.
RECENT CASES
Statements of the court to the effect that the number "8160" is not sufficient
indorsement to constitute G a holder in due course can only be unfortunate language.
It is inconceivable that a holder in due course could by improper indorsement deprive
himself of due course status. Thus the only reasonable construction is that such
indorsement, under these circumstances, is evidence of the alleged bad faith with
which G company took the instrument. It is undoubtedly true that an indorsement
must include a signature sufficent to identify the indorser so as not to require
parol evidence to prove that identity, but the point is not in issue here. The draft was
indorsed in blank and thus payable to bearer, s.e., negotiable by delivery without
further indorsement, Broadway Bank of Kansas City v. Whittaker, 177 Wash. 62,
30 P.(2d) 993 (1934), Rnm. Rav. STAT. § 3425 [P P. C. § 760-9] [N. I. L. § 34],
and no further indorsement would be necessary for intervenors to assert their
rights upon the draft.
The decision at first glance appears to be a return to the "suspicious circum-
stances" rule of Gill v. Cubit, 3 B. & C. 466 (1824) as G's failure to fully investi-
gate the business of D, a stranger-to G until two days previous to the negotiations,
seems to have been accepted as an indication of bad faith. This view was abrogated
by the adoption of the N. I. L. (enacted in Washington 1899) in favor of the rule
that bad faith is to be tested by actual knowledge or knowledge of such facts that
his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith. N. I. L. § 56. BnrrroN,
Bins AND NoTas, 410 § 101 (1943). See Rightnre, The Bad Faith Doctrine of
Negotiable Instruments, 18 MbcH. L. R. 355 (1920), McNamara v. Jose, 28 Wash.
461, 60 Pac. 903 (1902), Banner Meat Co. v. Rieger, 125 Wash. 142, 215 Pac. 334
(1925). However, the fact that G took the draft after D had requested hun to
indorse only by number would apparently be such bad faith as to be within the
purview of N. I. L. § 56. This and other facts disclosed upon examination of the
briefs could have justified the finding of bad faith by the trial court. Thus, while
the opinion should be criticized for not clearly stating the grounds for the conclu-
sion on this point, it is submitted that it probably does not herald a return to the
less favored doctrine of the minority.
D. E. R.
Tax Foreclosure--Way of Necessity-Easement of Access. P is grantee in fee
of one half of all the minerals, including oil, gas, and coal, lying in a defined tract.
The deed also granted an easement of ingress and egress and the right to use such
part of the surface as should be necessary to produce, store, refine, mill, and remove
the rmnerals. The owner of the surface estate neglected to pay the taxes and the
county foreclosed the tax lien. D is the purchaser under the foreclosure sale. P
brings action to quiet title to the minerals and appurtenances in himself. Judgment
for P D appeals. Held: Reversed in part. The foreclosure sale did not affect P's
estate in the minerals or his easement of ingress and egress which was "so much
appurtenant to the estate conveyed that it may be said to be a part thereof," but
it did cut off all right to put any structures on the surface or make any other use
of it. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Moyle, 162 Kan. 133, 175 P.(2d) 133 (1946).
Two problems are presented by this fact pattern. One, the effect of a tax fore-
closure sale on an ordinary easement will not be considered. For discussion of this
problem see King, The Assessment and Taxation of Easements, 16 WASH. L. REv.
36 (1941), and KIoek, Effect of Tax Deeds on Easements and Rights of Way, 16
CHi-KENT REv. 328 (1937). The additional problem of the effect of a tax fore-
closure sale upon an "easement of necessity" is presented where, as in Washington,
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an ordinary easement is cut off by the sale. Note: 40 A. L. R. 523, 4 SUMMERS, OIL
AND GAS (2d ed.) § 652; 3 TIFFANY ON REAL PROPERTY (3d ed.) § 772. The Kansas
courts, under the mandate of a strongly worded statute, have consistently vested
clear title in the tax deed grantee. Board of Regents of the Kansas State Agricul-
tural College v. Lsnscott, 30 Kan. 240, 1 Pac. 81 (1883), Girard Trust Co. v. Jones,
81 Kan. 753, 106 Pac. 1052 (1910) and cases there cited. The Washington cases
hold similarly. Harmon v. Gould, 1 Wn.(2d) 1, 94 P.(2d) 749 (1939), Wilson v.
Korte, 91 Wash. 30, 157 Pac. 47 (1916), Hanson v. Carr, 66 Wash. 81, 118 Pac. 927
(1911). The problem of "extraordinary" easements raises considerations different
than those involved in ordinary easements.
The Kansas court preserved the easement of ingress and egress in the principal
case apparently because it was felt to be inseparable from the dominant estate,
;.e., as long as the estate in the minerals existed, the easement must necessarily
co-exist. The court reached this result despite a statute providing that the grantee
in a tax foreclosure sale must take clear title. It may be that the same result is
suggested by the very nature of an estate. Ownership is technically defined as a set
of rights the total of which equals a fee. BIGELOW, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY, c. 2, § 2. It is at least arguable that the right of access is really one
of those rights inherent in the estate itself, rather than an easement in another's
land. Thus a tax foreclosure which did not touch the mineral estate could not by
definition touch the right of access. Regardless of the theory, however, the undem-
able hardships caused by a refusal to provide access to an otherwise inaccessible
estate in the minerals not cut off by the foreclosure sale would seem to make the
result almost inevitable. The Washington statute is much less strict. It provides
merely that the lien of general taxes is superior to all other liens and claims on
property. REM. REv. STAT. § 11260 [P P C. § 979-491]. Considering this, the Wash-
ington court should have little trouble in reaching the same result.
E. R. F
Trusts - Administration - Deviation from Terms of Trust Instrument. T died
in 1940. His 1939 will directed D, trustee, to pay his grandson P $750 per year for
support and education, such payments to continue as long as P was a student in
good standing at some recognized college "but in no event beyond December 31,
1945." P was ordered to active military duty in 1942, having then completed one
year of work in law school. After his discharge in 1946, P continued his legal studies
and brought this action to compel D to resume payments to him under the trust.
D contended that such payments were contrary to the clear terms of the will. Judg-
ment for P D appealed. Held. Affirmed, D required to make payments to P for an
additional period of three years. Donnelly v. National Bank of Washington, 27
Wn.(2d) 622, 179 P.(2d) 333 (1947).
While the managerial powers and duties of a trustee are circumscribed by the
trust instrument, a court of equity with inherent jurisdiction to control the adminis-
tration of trusts may not only define the extent of those powers and duties but may
within limits modify them or confer others. In re New, 2 Ch. 534 (1901), Scott,
Dematon from the Terms of a Trust, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1025 (1931). When inter-
vening circumstances not contemplated by the settlor would render the directed
course of conduct inadvisable for the welfare of beneficiaries and defeat or sub-
stantially impair accomplishment of the settlor's purposes, the court will direct or
permit the trustee to deviate from a term of the trust. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 167
(1935), 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 561 (1946). In such event the court must
RECENT CASES
as far as possible occupy the place of the settlor and do what it conceives he would
have dictated had he anticipated the exigency. Curtiss v. Brown, 29 Ill. 201 (1862),
2 Scorr, TRUSTS § 167 (1939). Deviation may involve the performance of acts not
authorized, onssion to perform acts directed, or performance of acts forbidden by
terms of the trust. Examples of authorization to do specifically prohibited acts,
clearly the most drastic form of deviation, include the granting of power to sell
trust assets, Price v. Long, 87 N. J. Eq. 578, 101 Atl. 195 (1917), Young v. Young,
255 Mich. 173, 237 N. W. 535 (1931), Kelly v. Marr, 299 Ky. 447, 185 S. W.(2d)
945 (1945), see annotation, 168 A. L. R. 1018 (1947), to execute long-term lease,
Marsh v. Reed, 184 Ill. 263, 56 N. E. 306 (1900), to sell at higher price, Adams v.
Cook, 15 Cal.(2d) 352, 101 P.(2d) 484 (1940), and to make other investments,
Cutter v. American Trust Co., 213 N. C. 686, 197 S. E. 542 (1938). In the majority
of cases examined the deviation was necessary to prevent serious impairment or
destruction of, or to gain some financial improvement for, the trust estate.
In the instant case the court concluded from the language of T's will that T had
not foreseen the contingency of world conflict interrupting P's schooling, that his
dominant purpose was to provide P with the specified funds with which to complete
his legal education, and that this purpose plainly overrode the time limitation.
Relying upon the rule of the RESTATEMENT, supra, the court ordered the trustee to
act in contravention of a term of the trust instrument (viz., the time limit upon
payments) to avoid frustration of the settlor's purpose. While this result is com-
mendable, the application of the deviation doctrine here appears to go beyond the
authority of the cases in which strict adherence to the terms of the trust would have
resulted in loss to the estate. Of all such cases it can be reasoned that the settlor
would have directed such an alternative procedure rather than allow his trust estate
to suffer unnecessary loss; hence the justification for judicial intervention is great.
Where no such emergency threatens the administration of the trust, exercise of
this equitable power should be tempered by the realization that any deviation may
defeat the expectations of the testator.
R. E. B.
Evidence--Confessions and Admissions. D was charged with first degree murder. At
the trial there was admitted in evidence, over objection, a complete stenographic
transcript of an interview in the prosecutor's office in which D had not confessed
guilt of the crime but had made several damaging statements. This transcript had
been signed and sworn to by D. Conviction and appeal, Held: Reversed. Since the
transcript did not admit guilt of the crime, it was not a confession and should have
been excluded as hearsay. State v. Gregory, 25 Wn. (2d) 773, 171 P. (2d) 1021 (1946).
The transcript was admittedly hearsay. The basis of its admission by the trial
court apparently was that it constituted a confess o and thus fell under a well-
recognized exception to the hearsay rule. The Supreme Court ruled correctly that
the transcript was not admissible as a confession since D did not admit the truth of
the guilty fact charged. 3 WGMoRE, EviDENCE § 821 (3rd ed. 1940).
It is submitted, however, that the transcript was properly admissible as an
admission. Anything ever said by a party opponent may be used against him, pro-
vided it exhibits inconsistency with the facts now asserted by him in the pleadings.
4 WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1048 (3rd ed. 1940). Since the transcript in the instant case
was signed and sworn to, it could be used not only for the purpose of refreshing the
witness' memory, but was, like any relevant written sttaement of the accused, itself
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admissible in evidence as an admission. State v. Dersty, 121 Wash. 455, 209 Pac.
837 (1922).
If the lower court committed any error it was in allowing the stenographer who
transcribed the transcript to read it in court. The only permissible use of the tran-
script by her was to refresh her recollection. See Seattle v. Erickson, 99 Wash. 543,
169 Pac. 985 (1918).
J.M.T.
Prudent Man Trust Investment Statute. Effective June 12, 1947, the Washington legis-
lature enacted the "prudent man" or Massachusetts rule of investment of trust
funds by fiduciaries. WASH. LAWS 1947, c. 100. Sections 2, 4, 5, and 7 of the act
constitute an almost verbatim enactment of the Model Prudent Man Statute pre-
pared by a committee of the Trust Division of the American Bankers Association.
The complete Washington act was formulated and strongly advocated in a pamphlet
issued by the Corporate Trustees Association of Washington entitled Proposed
Prudent Man Trust Investment Statute for Washington. The act repeals a group
of statutes which constituted a "legal list" or itemized specification of investments
which would be permissible for corporate trustees. Rm. Rnv. STAT. § 3255-1 et seq.
(P P C. § 313-1 et seq.).
This switch from the legal list to the prudent man rule brings Washington into
the rapidly growing group of eighteen states which has either legislatively (thirteen
states) or judicially (five states) determined that the interests of trust administra-
tion can best be served by allowing fiduciaries in their investments to be governed
by the exercise of such
judgment and care under the circumstances then prevailing, which men of prudence,
discretion and intelligence exercise in the management of their own affairs, not in
regard to speculation but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, con-
sidering the probable income as well as the probable safety of their capital (Sec. 2)
rather than by forcing them to adhere to an inflexible list of permitted investments.
A total of nine states, including Oregon and California, have now enacted the
Model Prudent Man Statute in whole or in part. 1 CCH TRUST & EST. LAw Sav.
9005 (1947). The relative merits of the two rules have been widely argued, with
a large majority of the commentators advocating the prudent man rule. In practical
operation the prudent man rule has apparently proved more satisfactory. Several
states have abandoned the legal list in favor of the prudent man rule; the reverse
has never occurred.
The most important changes effected by the new statute are. (1) the act applies
to individual as well as corporate trustees, whereas the legal list applied only to the
latter; (2) the act greatly liberalizes the scope of permitted investment to include
corporate bonds and common stock, while the legal list allowed investments involv-
ing no greater risk than public utility and industrial bonds.
Section 2 of the act, quoted above, incorporates the exact words of Mr. Justice
Putnam in the widely cited case of Harvard College v. Amory, 9 Pick. 446 (Mass.
1830), where the prudent man rule was first enunciated. A fair inference from this
is that the legislature intended to make available for the guidance of Washington
courts the large body of case law that has developed in Massachusetts under the
rule. Quick access to this case law is available in an article written by the draftsman
of the Model Statute, Mayo A. Shattuck, entitled, The Massachusetts Prudent Man
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it Trust Investments, 25 B. U. L. Rav. 307 (1945). The article was prepared espe-
cially for assistance to the bench and bar in states adopting the Model Statute.
A study of the literature on the subject indicates that the recent growth in the
number of states adopting .the Model Prudent M~fan Statute may in large measure
be attributed to agitation in its favor by corporate trustees. Unbiased authorities
agree that a rule which allows investment practices to remain freely adaptable to
changing economic conditions is superior to one which rigidly limits permitted
investments.
H.P
Mining-Definiton. In 1917 state school land was leased by P, State of Washington,
to the assignor of D for the purpose of developing magnesite deposits. In providing
for payment of four per cent royalties on gross income less certain specified costs,
the leasing agreement followed the language of REM. REv. STAT. § 8024, relating
to leasing of state mineral lands. In 1943 action was instituted to recover certain
royalties due under this agreement. D claimed that the original agreement had been
modified as to royalty payments in 1934 by the commissioner of public lands and
urged that tlus modification was within the commissioner's authority because D was
not conducting mining operations as provided by statute but rather was quarrying,
and that D has made all payments under the modification. Judgment for D in the
trial court. Appeal. Held. Reversed, three judges dissenting. Although D was in a
technical sense quarrying magnesite, the commissioner had no power to modify the
agreement. This is because mining is a very broad term; it includes dredging, placer
mining, and any means by which mineral is extracted from its resting place. As
such it includes quarrying. State v. Northwest Magnesite Co., 127 Wash. Dec. 900,
182 P.(2d) 643 (1947).
This is the first Washington case interpreting the meaning and scope of the term
ining. As originally used, the words mine and mining were exclusively connected
with underground workings. Bell v. Wilson, L. R. 1 Ch. 303, 35 L. J. Ch. 337
(1866), Murray v. Allard, 100 Tenn. 100, 43 S. W. 355 (1897), Brady v. Smith, 181
N. Y. 178, 73 N. E. 963 (1905). However, in later times these terms have received
broader interpretation. Under modem construction they are not limited to under-
ground excavations, but include minerals and material reached by open workings
and workable only by open cuts. Nephs Plaster & Mfg. Co. v. Juab County, 33 Utah
114, 93 Pac. 53 (1907), Certain-Teed Products Corp. v. Comly, 54 Wyo. 79, 87
P.(2d) 21 (1939), People v. Silver, 16 Cal.(2d) 714, 108 P.(2d) 4 (1940), 36
AM. JuR., MINEs & MINERALS, 281, § 2.
Although the dissent is correct if the lay definition of this term is used (see
WEsTeR's Nnw INT=RKATioNAL DicrIONARY), it seems desirable that this particular
statute receive a broad interpretation since it relates to a means whereby the state
can profitably utilize public lands containing mineral deposits. It is believed that in
view of the unrestricted wording of the authority relied upon, principally AmEmuCAN
JurIspRumENcE, this case will be determinative of the meaning given to the term
mining as used in other Washington statutes unless it clearly appears in such
statute that the legislature intended othermvse.
Nothing is found in the following statutes which precludes this approach; see
REM. REv. STAT. § 8608 et seq. (P P C. § 29-1) Mining Corporations; REM. REv.
STAT. § 8614-1 et seq. (P P C. § 739-1) State Development of the Mining Industry;
REm. REv. STAT. § 8615 et seq. (P P C. § 738-1) Location and Possession of Min-
ing Loads; and REM. REv. STAT. § 7797-155 et seq. (P P C. § 940-279) Leasing of
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State Mineral Lands. (This last section concerns leases made after 1927.) REMr.
REv. STAT. § 8857 et seq. (P P C. § 738-43) Protection Against Open Shafts is so
broad in language that it would not be necessary to determine whether iining
comprehended quarrying. On the other hand, as to REM. REv. STAT. § 8636 et seq.
(P P C. § 742-3) Coal Mining Code, although REM. REv. STAT. § 8636 (P P C.
§ 742-3) defines a mine simply as "all excavations penetrating coal or other strata,"
the qualification in REM. REv. STAT. § 8856 (P P C. § 742-5) stating that "no coal
mine shall be considered a mine for the purpose of this act unless five or more men
are employed underground" would seem to prevent utilization of the broad defini-
tion. Finally REM. Rxv. STAT. § 7675 (P P C. § 709-1) Workman's Compensation
Act, by specifically distinguishing between the two terms, precludes the applicability
of the instant case as to definition.
R. A. C.
